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In the Supreme Court
olthe Slate ol Utah
CLYDE J. KNAPP. OLIVES. KNAPP.
JEFF KNAPP. an infant. by Clyde
J. Knapp, his Guardian ad Litem.
VICKIE KNAPP. an infant. by Clyde
J. Knapp. her Guardian ad Litem,
Plaintiffs and Respondents.

Case No.
8875

vs.
LIFE INSURANCE CORPORATION
OF AMERICA. a Utah corporation,
Defendant and Appellant,

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
For convenience, defendant and appellant will be referred to as defendant. plaintiffs and respondents will be
referred to collectively as plaintiffs. and plaintiff and respondent 'Clyde J. Knapp, will be referred to as Knapp. All italics
are ours. To the extent that plaintiffs do not disagree with the
Statement of Facts made in defendant's Brief. they will refrain from repeating such facts and will confine their Statement
to facts as to which they may disagree with defendant or
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which they feel were omitted by defendant. Furthermore,
their Statement of Facts will be confined, so far as possible,
to the facts pertaining to the Points raised by and argued in
Defendant's Brief.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
This is an action by plaintiffs against defendant seeking
to rescind, on the ground of fraud and deceit, a transaction
under which plaintiffs sold and assigned to defendant, the
sellers' interest in two separate contracts of sale ie., {a) one
covering real estate at 10834 South State Street, Salt Lake
County, 21 shares of water stock. together with all equipment,
machinery and livestock thereon, on which there was an agreed
balance then owing of $27,875.00, and, {b) a second contract covering certain livestock located on said real property.
on which there was then a balance owing of $6,508.03, making
a total agreed price and reasonable value of $34,383.03.
Plaintiffs received in payment thereof $4,383.03 cash and
1500 shares at $20.00 per share or $30,000.00 worth of the
capital stock of defendant company. Plaintiffs offered and
'pow offer to return to defendant everything,........cash, with interest thereon, and stock,........received from :defendant in the transaction upon being restored to a status quo position by defendant, or to the extent that defendant may not be able to restore
'all of plaintiffs' property, to have a money judgment for the
value of that which may not be restored, ·with interest on such
value from the date of the transaction, December 30, 1954.
Plaintiffs have offered, by stipulation, to accept from
defendant, if same is tendered, the real estate on South State
Street and 21 shares of water stock therewith, subject to an
outstanding contract of sale to a Mr. Morrison and to credit
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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the remaining balance of the sale price owing by the buyer.
amounting to approximately $30,000.00, on any money
judgment which might be awarded plaintiffs. (Tr. 70).

V. H. Heaton has offered :to retransfer this property so
;sold to Mr. Morrison, to defendant. subject to his contract of
~ale with Morrison. and to assign to defendant his interest.
as ;Seller. in Morrison's contract, upon receiving payment for
his, Heaton's. equity, should defendant elect to return said
property to plaintiffs and receive credit on th judgment. ( T r.
252. 254, 859, to 861).
The ,trial court found all material issues in favor of
plaintiffs and entered in said case Findings of Facts and
Conclusions of Law ( R. 16) finding that in connection with
the foregoing transaction, and to induce plaintiffs to sell to
defendant the aforementioned contracts of sale defendant had
made to plaintiffs the many false representations as set forth
in said Findings. It would be hard to find in the books. a
case in which so many and such flagrant misrepresentations
were made in one transaction as occured in this matter. If
the court were interested in ex~ining the evidence regarding
these misrepresentations, it would be found, among other
things, that whereas defendant represented to plaintiff in its
Financial Statement of September 30, 1954, ( P. 4). that it
had liabilities of only $3,429.49, exclusive of capital stock
liability. it actually had liability, as shown by the audit made
by plaintiffs' auditor, Mr. Cummings, (P. 62) of $54,047.77.
(Tr. 18, 333, 340. 484. 500). or roughly fifteen times the
amount represented; instead of having $63,875.22 of mortgage
loans, p.s represented ( P. 4). Mr. Cummings found that defendant actually had only $4,814.22 of such :mortgages, (P.
62. Tr. 445-447). or about 1/15 as much. Many other just as
glaring instances of deceit were alleged. proved and found by
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the Court. The Court found present all elements of actionable
fraud and deceit. The Court found in favor of plaintiffs all
other facts necessary to entitle thelm to rescind said contract
and recover judgment against defendant. It found that on and
prior to January 5, 1955, plaintiffs Clyde J. Knapp and Olive
S. Knapp were the owners of sellers' equity in the contract of
sale of certain livestock and other personal property which they
then owned and that there was a balance owing from the
buyers, Volma W. Heaton and Ellen Heaton, of $6,508.03
on the purchase price, which was the then agreed and reasonable value of said plaintiff's equity therein and that said two
plaintiffs were also then the owners of sellers' equity in a
contract of sale with Volma W. Heaton and D. H. Heaton,
covering certain real estate, water stock and personal property
on which the balance then owing and the agreed and reasonable value of said equity was $27,875.00, making a combined total owing on said two contracts of $34,383.03 which
was the reasonable and .agreed value thereof. said contracts
being identified as parts of Exhibits P. 5, P. 6 and P. 7; that
on January 5, 1955 plaintiff, Clyde J. Knapp, and defendant
signed the Agreement, (Ex. P. 9) providing for the exchange
of the contracts o/ sale above referred to for $4,383.03 cash
and 1500 shares of defendant's capital stock and that said
contracts were thereupon assigned to the defendant and that
conveyance was made to defendant of the property described
in said contracts, subject to the rights of the purchasers under
said contracts. The court specifically found, and the evidence
supports such finding ( R. 21 ) , that plaintiffs did not have
knowledge, prior to August 30, 1955 of facts which would
have prompted a person of ordinary prudence to make necessary investigations as to the truth or falsity of the fraudulent
representations cO'mplained of; that shortly after August 30,
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1955 plaintiff Clyde J. Knapp received a letter from defendant's then attorney, Reese Anderson, (Ex. P. 11, Tr. 42, 43,
44, 164) and he then first became aware of facts which
charged him with the duty to investigate as to the matters
complained of: that he then immediately consulted his attorney
and employed hm to investigate and take necessary action
(R. 21. Tr. 50 to 53): that plaintiffs did not unreasonably
delay the investigating or giving notice of the intention to rescind after they became aware of facts which charged them
with notice of matters complained of and that on October
2~ 1955 plaintiffs formally notified defendants that plaintiffs
elected to rescind said transaction in its entirety, (Ex. P. 15) ,
which offer was declined; that plaintiffs have ever since been
and are now willing and able to rescind and return to defendant all consideration, cash and stock received from defendant.
The court found ( R. 22) that almost immediately upon receiv~
ing from plaintiffs the assignments of contracts, defendant cancelled said contracts. substituting therefor other and different
contracts of sale of the property described in such contracts;
that said defendant company subsequently cancelled said different and substituted contracts and permitted the livestock
and other personal property to be sold for approximately
$5,000.00. Findings were also made concerning the later disposition of the real property and water stock to Daniel H.
Heaton and Eva W. Heaton and of the sale by them to J. G.
Morrison. The court found that the value of the contracts so
assigned, at the time of such assignment, was $34,383.03 and
that by their agreEIDl:ent of January 5, 1955, ( P. 9), the
parties fixed that as such value and that the purchase price
thereof had been paid to plaintiffs by defendant in the sum
of $4,383.03 cash and 1500 shares of stock.

Appropriate Conclusions of Law were entered along

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

6

with a Decree giving to plaintiffs a money judgment for the balance owing on the two contracts assigned to defendant, with interest, less the amount paid in cash to plaintiffs. with interest.
and directing plaintiffs to return to defendant the 1500 shares
of capital stock. The Decree .further provided that if within 60
days, defendant conveyed to plaintiffs title to the Knapp real
estate. subject only to the ~rights of the· buyer under the real
estate contract dated August 5, 1955 between the Heatons
as sellers and J. G. Morrison as buyer, together with proper
transfer of sellers' rights under such contract, then the plaintiffs should credit defendant, on such judgment with the
amount of the balance then owing by the buyer Morrison on
said contract. Defendant makes no .complaint of the Findings,
Conclusions or Decree of the court except on two points,
which are the sole grounds of its appeal. to-wit: that (a) "If
there was fraud. plaintiffs are now barred from asserting it by
their lack of diligence in rescinding and by laches." and, (b)
''There is no evidence to support the money judgment awarded
plaintiffs in this action."
On April 1, 1954, Daniel H. Heaton was employed
as an agent of the defendant company to sell its capital stock
at $20.00 a share (Ex. 27). Heaton contacted Knapp about
November 1, 1954, soliciting him to buy stock in defendant
company, and closed the deal on January 5. 1955, although
~he transfer of contracts of sale and underlying properties was
dated December 30, 1954, apparently dated back in order
that the transaction would appear in the 1954 annual statement. In the agreelnent of January 5, 1955, (P. 9, D. 20)
it was stated: "The value of the capital stock of the company
is $20.00 per share and the total value o/ the contracts o/ sale
on all land, equipment and livestock to be assigned to the
company by purchaser is $34,385.03." Note that the thing
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sold and valued was the contracts and not the real estate or
personal property which secured them. Simultaneously with
the closing of the Knapp deal. defendant cancelled the Knapp
contracts, which had been assigned to it, and wrote two new
contracts (P. 33-34) which it dated 'December 30, 1954.
reciting a sale price in one contract of $34,383.03 and in the
other contract a sale price of $4,383.03 (Tr. 212, 218, 221 ).
It should be noted that these new contracts specifically cancelled the older contracts which Knapp had assigned to the
company; that the buyers are not the same in the old and the
new contracts; that the amounts of the sale price in each of
the two new contracts differs entirely from the balance which
was owing on each of the two old Knapp contracts. For instance, there was owing on the old livestock contract $6,508.03
when turned over by Knapp, whereas the new livestock contract was for $4,383.03 only. The balance on the old Knapp
real estate contract, with some personal property included
therein, was $27.875.00, whereas the new contract for the
same property recites a consideration of $34,383.03. The
monthly payments on the two old contracts were $219.83 and
$300.00 respectively, or a total of $519.83, whereas on the
new contracts they were $175.38 and $83.04 respectively, or
a total of $258.42. The description of the personal property
in the old and the new contracts is different. Apparently the
new contracts do not include all of the personal property embraced in the old ones. At this point, it became impossible for
defendant to have restored Knapp to a status quo position.
since his contracts had been annihilated and the new contracts
bore no relationship to the old, the security behind each having
been entirely changed and rearranged. None of this was known
to Knapp until the trial of this case in July, 1957. (Tr. 12168-222-224) .
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V olma Heaton injured his back early in 1955 and fell
behind on payments on these new contracts. He was excused
from making regular payments by defendant. (Tr. 231-2, 2856). About April 1, 1955, defendant requested Heaton to try
to sell just the real property and water stock, without any livestock, machinery or equipment in order to get it in a position
to qualify as an admissible asset. Heaton procured a buyer for
the real property and water stock only at a price of $35,500.00,
in the person of Mr. Van Zyverden whose man actually moved
on the property and harvested some of the crops. This deal
Jinally fell through because of a difficulty in title to the property Van Zyverden was turning to defendant. At about the
same time, Volma Heaton, with the consent of defendant,
sold all of the livestock which had been included in the Knapp
contracts for approximately $5,000.00, which he was allowed
to keep as his equity in the properties. This made a total of
$40,500.00 for which the Knapp property was thus arranged
to be sold. (Tr. 226, 298, 305, 307). This additional act of
stripping the real estate of all livestock rendered it absolutely impossible for defendant to have restored plaintiffs
to their status quo position. These transactions were entirely
unknown to Knapp until the trial of this case. (Tr. 68-121222) . After the real property had come back to the defendant.
it sold just the real estate and water, without any personal
property, to Heaton in August of 1955 for $32.000. (Tr. 229,
237, 238, 243, 244. 245, 297-8). \\'hen Knapp turned the
contracts in there was a balance owing on the livestock contract
of over $6500.00 which was now gone plus some other livestock. machinery and equipment, included in the so-called real
estate contracts which likewise were gone. Heaton immediately
sold just the real property and water. no personal property, to
Morrison for $36,000.00, with $5,000.00 down, (Ex. P. 39,
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Tr. 240, 242. 297) and Morrison's pa)trnents are right up to
date. (Tr. 252).
There was no offer ever made by the defendant to return to Knapp the contracts he had assigned to defendant or
~ven of any of the underlying security described therein prior
to the stockholders' meeting of May 10, 1955, or at any time
prior to the first of August. 1955. (Tr. 156-7, 159, 166. 170.
287. 288). Neither Knapp nor Heaton heard anything at the
May 10. 1955 stockholders' meeting which caused them to
suspect that Knapp had been defrauded in the original transaction some months earlier but the main thing of importance
which they heard at said .meeting was the need of correcting
the company's condition by changing its real estate into an
acceptable form so it would become an admissible asset to the
State Insurance Commission. (Tr. 134, 135).
In its Brief. defendant refers to the letter of Reese Anderson of August 30. 1955 (Ex. P. 11 ) , as being "rather
mild in tone, merely requesting a prompt decision on signing the
voting trust agreement.'' The exhibit enclosed with the letter.
ie., Trust Agreement, which when signed would be a "blank
check'' to the trustees to do anything they wanted with plaintiff's' stock, was. on the contrary, "a bombshell" calculated to
startle any stockholder. It was followed by a series of further
communications from defendant and finally resulted. in early
November 1955, in the taking over of the company. by out
of State people who put in $200.000 cash at $20.00 per share.
This resulted in the existing stockholders receiving only $25,000
of stock for their stock for which they had paid $338,000, or
one share for each thirteen shares. Under this arrangement
plaintiffs would get 111 shares of the same par value for their
1500 shares representing a loss of over 12/ 13ths of their investment.
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STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED UPON
POINT I
PLAINTIFFS. WITHIN A REASONABLE TIME
AFTER DISCOVERING THE FACTS CONSTITUTING FRAUD. ELECTED TO RESCIND. NOTIFIED
DEFENDANT OF SUCH ELECTION AND OFFERED
TO RESTORE DEFENDANT TO STATUS QUO.
(a) Plaintiffs acted with due diligence and are not
barred /rom rescission by lack
scinding or by laches.

o/ diligence

in re-

(b) Delay alone, without detriment

or change in position, caused by the delay, is not laches or a defense to an action in rescission.

(c) Conclusion o/ trial court, as to whether party has
acted promptly to rescind a contract, or is guilty
of laches, will not be set aside by appellate court
i/ the conclusion /inds substantial support in the
evidence.

POINT II.
T H ERE IS LEGAL AND COMPETENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE MONEY JUDGMENT
A\\'ARDED PLAINTIFFS IN THIS ACTION.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
PLAINTIFFS, \VITHIN A REASONABLE TIME
AFTER DISCOVERING THE FACTS CONSTITUTING FRAUD. ELECTED TO RESCIND, NOTIFIED
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DEFENDANT OF SUCH ELECTION AND OFFERED
TO RESTORE DEFENDANT TO STATUS QUO.

(a) Plaintiffs acted with due .diligence and are not
barred /rom rescission by lack
scinding or by laches.

o/ diligence

in re-

Defendant contends. in its Brief. that if there was fraud,
plaintiffs are now barred from asserting it by their lack of diligence in rescinding and by laches. These contentions, plaintiffs deny.
Plaintiffs maintain and we submit that the evidence
shows that the first suspicion plaintiffs had of fraud was early
in September 1955, when Knapp received Reese Anderson's
letter of August 30, 1955, (Ex. P. 11, Tr. 42. 43, 44, 164).
What did Knapp do? He went at once to his attorney for
counsel as to what his rights were and placed the matter in
his hands. (Tr. 50 to 53). The testimony shows that the attorney proceeded immediately to the office of the Insurance Commissioner to obtain all inf'mtnation possible as to the financial
condition of defendant and whether or not it had committed
fraud on plaintiffs. (Tr. 50 to 53, 171). He was informed
that an audit was being made for the Insurance Commission
and that in due time it would be made available for public
inspection. Knapp, who was working ·in the southern part of
the state and came home only on week ends. inquired each
time he was in town as to what had been found out. He was
told that the attorney had contacted the Insurance Commissioner repeatedly but that the audit had· not been completed.
Knapp testified that it was either a question of obtaining the
facts which this audit would disclose or having an independent
audit made by himself. at considerable expense. and which
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would take longer than to wait for completion of the one in
progress. He testified that the audit was completed and exhibited to the attorney in the early part of October; that the
attorney assured him that he was having the audit analyzed
and compared with the September 30. 1954 ( P .4) financial
statement of defendant, used in selling Knapp, and was obtaining additional information and evidence to determine
whether he had been defrauded. He was advised of his rights
by his attorney and on October 25. 1955, only about six weeks
after he first even suspected there might be fraud, he served
definite notice of election to rescind, (P. 15) on defendant.
Khapp testified that in September or October he notified
Tucker. the representative of the financiers who took over the
company by reorganization, that he would probably ask for
his property back. We submit that this notice of rescission was
served in a very short time. and with all necessary diligence on
defendant, considering the unusual circumstances of the case
and the need for obtaining detailed and technical infortnation
in order to know what the rights were. This should be conclusive of plaintiffs' rights to rescind and be restored to status
quo or if that cannot be done to have a money judgment
against defendant.
But, defendant argues that plaintiff learned of facts at an
earlier date which should have made him suspicious that he
had been defrauded, thus putting him under the duty of investigating such facts. It seems to ·maintain that it became the
duty of plaintiff. within a reasonable time after the first of
these matters came to his attention, to notify defendant of dedsion to rescind and that failure to do so constituted laches.
Plaintif'fs deny this.
What are the alleged facts relied on by defendant? First.
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it isays that defendant offered before the May 10, 1955 meeting to trade Knapp back his property for the consideration he
received. The only testimony supporting any such thing is the
hearsay evidence of Mr. Lowe that at said meeting he talked
to Heaton about the objection of the Insurance Conunissioner
to the two large Heaton and Knapp properties and Heaton
said that he had had a conversation with Bullard a short time
before when he was infonned of this objection. They talked
about the voting at the meeting and Heaton said that both he
and Knapp had been approached by Bullard with respect to
trrading the property back. (Tr. 691). Both Knapp and Heaton
categorically denied that any offer of trade back ever was mentioned at this time or at any other time before August, 1955,
(Tr. 156, 157 to 159, 166, 170, 287, 288). Certainly the preponderance of the evidence is that no such offer ever was made,
but further, we submit that had there been such an offer, it is
evident that it had to do with the need to dispose of the two
very large pieces of real estate because they were not admissible
assets. There would be utterly no inference from this need that
fraud had been practiced on Knapp in their acquisition. Furthermore, under the circwnstances of this case and the law, delay
from early May to October would not constitute laches, if such
offer had ever been made, especially as it couldn't have resulted in any detriment to or change in the position of defendant, because it had already disposed of the contracts which
Knapp had turned to it, as shall hereafter be shown. Defendant defeats its own argument when it first says that the purpose
of the alleged offer was to change the two large properties into
admissible assets and in the next breath says that the motive
was that Bullard wanted to retire the hostile stock of Heaton
and Knapp so he could keep his job. Neither of these reasons
would suggest fraud a half a year earlier.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

14

Second, defendant states that failure to pay the proposed
10% dividend should have caused Knapp to suspect fraud. We
submit that the mere failure to pay this dividend, standing
alone, until the later audit disclosed the true financial condition of defendant and that it was impossible to have paid a
dividend of any sort, since defendant was insolvent, was not
calculated to make Knapp suspect fraud, but could then be
deemed merely a failure to keep a promise. Later, when the
true facts were developed by the audit, it became obvious that
in making this promise, fraud had ben committed, since there
w.as no possibility for a dividend to have been legally paid
and Bullard ·knew this and never intended to keep his promise
when made.
Third, defendant argues that since Knapp had heard
rumors that Bullard was turning down business because he
didn't like the sale!man, this was enough to put him on notice
that he had been defrauded a half year earlier. \Vhile, if
true, this would indicate a .strange manager, we ask how in the
world it would possibly suggest fraud against Knapp?
Fourth, defendant lays great stress on the meeting of
May 10, 1955, as something which should have put Knapp
on notice that he had been defrauded. \ Vhile, no doubt. this
was an interesting meeting and touched on quite .a few subjects,
we have searched, in. vain. for anything which happened there
which could have made Knapp feel that he had been defrauded months earlier. when the transaction was closed
All of the discussion and complaints. there Yoiced, had to do
with current operations. According to Knapp. there was talk of
a suit against the company for commissions; discussion regarding the election of directors; a considerable part of the day was
devoted to the dispute about voting, about the Insurance ComSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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missioner giving trouble regarding the large blocks of Heaton
and Knapp real estate; talk of doctors bringing capital into the
c<tnpany to supply the needed admissible assets; a brief discussion of financial conditions; much discussion regarding Knapp's
and Heaton's property not being acceptable; but to all of this
Bullard replied and assured those present that corrective steps
were being taken. There was some discussion about the order of
the Insurance Commissioner but Knapp stated that there
seemed to be no alarm on the part of the officers of the company because they were going to make such corrections as were
necessary and were going to correct the matter of the two land
items to make them ad6issible. To this question "Then it is
your memory that the only things that were discussed which
hal to be corrected were the insurance properties. the so-called
Heaton property and the Knapp fallffi property?". he answered,
''Those are the only things I recall of any importance that was
to be done." When pressed by counsel on cross examination as
to what was said after the Heaton and Knapp properly were
disallowed, Knapp replied: "It was not an alarming situation.
They were going to correct it. That was understood.'' (Tr. 130
to 149). Heaton confirmed that the big question before the
meeting w.as the problem of these big properties and their disposition to make the assets admissible, (Tr. 312). Lowe testified
'that George McMillan asked if it were not true that the Insurance Commissioner had served notice of revocation, and that
Bullard had replied that it had to do only with two blocks of
property mentioned in the March 31. 1955letter, (P. 52) and
that they felt this was going to be worked out. (Tr. 698).
Lowe further testified regarding the discussion concerning these
two large properties and stated that Mr. Bergesen asked if the
Insurance Commissioner had not put defendant on notice that
the two big properties were too large. He said Bullard admitted
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that some question had been raised, but that the company had
a solution to the two blocks of property and they were going
to have it worked out in short order, (T r. 696.) Defendant's
other witness, Purrington, testified similarly, (Tr. 847, 848,
852, 855). lt will also be noted that in P. 52, the letter from
the Insurance Commissioner to Mr. Lowe, of March 31, 1955,
the principal item mentioned was these two parcels of real
estate. This is true also of other communications. It is obvious,
that as Knapp said, the main thing discussed and which made
an impression on him and on Heaton was the problem of admissible assets, as affected by these two large properties and
certainly there was nothing about that which caused any suspicion of fraud. It was just a current problem which needed
solution and a problem which could not possibly have arisen
until after the purchase of the stock by plaintiffs. Knapp
testified that on the basis of what he heard at the meeting, he did not consider that his stock interest was in jeopardy to any great extent, if they carried through what they
were planning to do to correct the situation, and that he knew
the value was in the property and it was only a matter of the
changing of the form of the assets, (Tr. 136). Defendant, itself. apparently agrees that Knapp's chief concern gro\\ing out
of this .meeting was that corrective measures, promised by
Bullard to change the nature of the Heaton and Knapp real
estate assets, which made up a large part of defendant's assets,
be taken. Knapp stated that nothing said at this meeting made
him suspicious that fraud had been committed on him when
he purchased his stock in 195---t. (Tr. 163). There \Ye have
Knapp's uncontradicted statement and we believe that any one
else who attended that meeting would have felt the same way
about it. It was admitted that Knapp was probably not present
during the whole time of the meeting, ( Tr. 170, 844), and that
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he might have been out. as testified to by Mr. Lowe, (Tr. 711.
712). Defendant's witness Purrington admitted that there
was great confusion in the meeting hall with people trying to
get the floor, ITr. 845); that there were discussions going on
between and among different groups while the meeting was in
progress. (Tr. 846). He and Lowe testified that there was only
one microphone in the hall. which was on the rostrum and that
those in the body of the hall did not use it, (Tr. 717, 720.
846). Purrington admitted that his only recollection of what
occurred at the meeting was from a tape recording and that
some parts of that were garbled. (Tr. 846). It was further testified that the meeting was held in a large room and that it was
possible that sQllle things were said which were not heard by
all of those present; that there were several trying to get the
floor at the same time; that there were three groups in the hall
besides some scattered around and on the stand. Mr. Lowe
testified to this, (Tr. 717. 720). Although Mr. Lowe purported to relate all that transpired at the meeting, he omitted
several things mentioned by two other witnesses and although
one witness said that Reese Anderson had talked about what
would happen to defendant unless it was refinanced, {T r.
826), Lowe stated that he remembered no such thing having
been said. (Tr. 699). It is apparent from this that Knapp was
not present during all of the meeting and that in view of the
confusion in the hall. some things might have been said which
Knapp did not hear. because Lowe himself failed to hear some
things that were reported to have been said.
'Defendant next refers to the financial statement of April
20. 1955, {D. 68) and to the other one, (P. 69) and thinks
that some differences between certain figures therein and those
shown in the September 30, 1954 statement should have put
plaintiffs on notice they had been defrauded. We submit that
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in the first place, Knapp had no recollection of having seen
D. 68 (Tr. 136, 137) and he thinks that he got P. 69 by mail
later. Lowe testified he didn't know whether Knapp got either
D. 68 or P. 69 at the May;meeting, (Tr. 712). Lowe said the
statement was distributed either at the May meeting or before
June 30, 1955, (Tr. 710). It is therefore likely that Knapp
did not obtain any such statement but in any event, of course,
Knapp didn't have the September 30, 1954 statement before
him for comparison when he received P. 69 and the difference
in the items mentioned by defendant would make no impression and, in fact, the differences could well have actually
occurred in the operation of the company during the period involved. We point 10ut that the folffis and method of preparation of the two statements, September 30, 1954, (Ex. P. 4)
and the one of April 30, 1955 (Ex. D. 68) are so vastly different that companisons of figures would be impossible by anyone other than an accountant, even if he had been in possession
of' both such statements, which Knapp was not. and that even
an accountant would have had difficulty in any such comparison. It certainly would not have been apparent to a person
such as Knapr\;2 1arouse suspicion placing him under duty to
take the technicaL :and expensive procedure of ascertaining the
truthfulness of the April 30 statmnent. We submit that there
was nothing here to cause suspicion of fraud.
We fail to see the relevancy of defendant's labored
argument that Knapp didn't take over the prerogatives of the
officers of the defendant company when he learned that the
Insurance Commissioner was challenging the Heaton and
Knapp properties as admissible assets, and dispose of them.
That was n~ither his duty nor prerogative. \ Vhat does that
have to do with laches? Defendant does point out that Knapp
did inquire of Bullard as to progress he was making, to which
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Bullard replied: "Fine." (Tr. 149). Furthermore. Knapp testified that it was his understanding that the necessary corrective steps had been taken and that the company was going
along all right, that these corrective steps having been taken.
that was all that was required to comply with the requirements
of the state. ( T r. 15 7. 158) . Finally defendant refers to the
conversation which Heaton had with Knapp, early in August.
1955. regarding a transaction by which Knapp might repurchase from defendant just the real estate and water stock which
was a part. only. of the property described in and given as
security for one of the two contracts which Knapp had sold to
defendant. It should be remembered that Heaton was the
instigator of these negotiations, not defendant. in order that
Knapp would not think ill of Heaton when he received
back his Bloomington property by cancellation of the deal
with defendant. This was no offer to restore Knapp to status quo on the basis of recision for fraud. Defendant had
never admitted fraud and up to this time Knapp had never
suspected fraud. Indeed. it was utterly impossible for defendant to restore to Knapp what it had received from him. He
had assigned two contracts which were eac~ -~ured by certain
definitely described property and as a coUateral action had
deeded the land and transfered the underlying security to
defendant. Defendant. almost simultaneously cancelled the
.existing Knapp contracts and wrote two entirely new and different ones, dated 'December 30. 1954. reciting that they
were "in lieu" of the Knapp contracts. The Knapp contracts
had been annihilated by the voluntary action of defendant and
couldn't have been returned. Furthermore. in April 1955,
months before this alleged offer to trade back occurred. and
even before the alleged offer to trade back which defendant
claims occurred prior to the May 10. 1955 meeting. every foot
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of livestock and all machinery, equipment, hay and the personal property had, with the consent of defendant, been
.stripped from the farm and sold by V olma Heaton for approximately $5,000.00 which was retained by him as his
equity.
Therefore, the most that could be claimed for this August discussion with Knapp was that it was a feeler by defendant to ascertain whether Knapp was willing, not to rescind
and be restored to status quo, but rather to purchase a part
only of the property which secured the two then extinct
contracts he had turned to defendant, on terms and at a price
fixed by defendant and which bore no relationship whatever
to the price at which he had sold to defendant. No wonder
he showed no interest. But even so, defendant did not offer
to negotiate but told Heaton it couldn't take Knapp's stock
back anyhow since the stock had been issued and couldn't
legally be cancelled by defendant. Therefore, defendant did
not actually make a bona fide offer to trade back, nor even to
.sell the farm and water back to Knapp.
\Ve emphasize, as did the court at the trial. that it was
two contracts of sale which plaintiffs sold to defendant, rather
than the property described in the contracts. ( T r. 799). The
property was the underlying security of the contracts, but seller
had no more right to said property than a stranger, if the buyers
performed and completed payment. The contracts might be
worth more or less than the property which secured same, depending on many factors, including the moral risk of the buyers, their financial condition, the earnings on the contracts, etc.
We submit that no inference of original fraud could be
drawn from these negotiations \\'ith Knapp to sell him the
fatm because it was thoroughly consistent with an absence
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of fraud. It was generally known that this Knapp farm was
an inadmissible asset and had to be changed into some other
Jorm by sale or otherwise to make it acceptable. That was the
burden of the complaint of the Insurance Commissioner and
had been discussed at the stockholders' meeting. Knapp knew
this and although he had thought that the corrective steps had
been taken after the May meeting, when this proposal to sell
hi!m the fa11m was made, it was nothing to make him suspicious
that he had been defrauded in its acquisition, originally, by
defendant. No reasonable man will think differently. Knapp
knew that defendant was endeavoring to convert the Knapp
real estate into cash in order to become an admissible asset.
(Tr. 134-5).
Summarizing our position that notice of election to rescind was given within a reasonable tlme and that plaintiffs
are not barred from rescinding by lack of diligence or by laches,
we make these points:
(a) Plaintiffs first had reason to suspect fraud in the
early part of September, 1955 and Knapp immediately placed
,the matter in the hands of his attorney to investigate for fraud.
The attorney proceeded expeditiously to determine the facts
and in view of the technical investigation required, plaintiffs.
in a very short time, served notice, on October 25, 1955, of
election to rescind. There could be no laches her.
(b) There was no offer to trade back prior to the May
10, 1955 meeting and therefore no notice therefrom.

(c) There was nothing said or done at the May 10, 1955
stockholders' meeting or in connection with the conversation in
early August regarding the sale to Knapp of his old fafrn on
State Street to put him on notice of fraud or to make him
suspect that he had been defrauded.
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(d) Even if it could be held, which plaintiffs deny, that
plaintiffs were placed on notice of any facts at the May 10,
1955 meeting which could have caused suspicion of fraud, we
contend that they were not guilty of laches in giving notice of
~election, considering the particular circumstances of this case.
In support of plaintiffs' foregoing position we respectfully
refer the court to the following authorities with respect to
laches:
Knapp had the right to presume that defendant was
acting honestly and fairly. See Cha!mberlain v. Wakefield
(Cal.) 213 P. 2d 62:

"* * a

person can act upon a presumption that there
exists no intention to defraud him.''
See also Mayer v. Homestead Fire Insurance Company, 150
Neb. 556, 35 N. W. 2d 413.
Mere suspicion is not "knowledge of fraud." See Hartford Empire Company v. Glenshaw Glass Co. (Pa.) 47 F. 'D.
711, which holds that:
'·A mere suspicion or opportunity to learn the
truth through the exercise of reasonable diligence does
not constitute 'knowledge of fraud' sufficient to constitute failure to assert right within a reasonable time
'laches' barring recovery for fraud."
It is stated thus in 9 Am. Jur. 391:
"48. \Vant of Diligence in Discovering Fraud or
Mistake . . . . Generally in cases of active misrepresentation or fraud practiced by one party to a contract on
the other. mere want of diligence in discovering fraud
does not deprive the injured party of a right to recission. He owes the other party no duty of active vigiSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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lance, and required only to act promptly after discovery

o/ /raud."

A person is not required to investigate matters of a technical nature of which seller has full knowledge and buyer has
none:
''There are many exceptions to the general rule
stated in Carpenter v. Hamilton, 11 8Cal. App. 2d
69, 75; 62 P. 2d 1397, to the effect that in fraud
cases, where the buyer is aware of suspicious circumstances or has learned of the falsity of one or more of
the representations, he is under a legal duty to make a
complete investigation and may not rely on the statements of the seller. They are ( 1) that the buyer is not
.required to employ experts to investigate matters of a
technical nature of which the seller has full knowledge
and the buyer has none. and if for this reason the investigation is incomplete he may show that he relied
on representations as to matters which he did not investigate; ( 2) that a buyer is not chargeable with
knowledge of conditions which he fails to discover
because of some artifice or deception of the seller. For
other exceptions see Palladine v. Imperial Valley Farm
Lands Association, 65 Cal. App. 727, 225 P. 291."
Lobdell v. Miller, (Cal.) 250 P. 2d 357.
See Utah case of Mawhinney v. Jensen, 232 P. 2d 769:
"Equitable relief from fraud will not be granted
where party was negligent in relying upon misrepresentations under grossly suspicious circumstances. but
n.uch rule is not applicable where examination o/ subject matters would require special training or technical
knowledge.''
See also Chamberlain v. Wakefield (Cal.) 213 P. 2d 62.
In this case, Knapp, to discover the fraud, was under the
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necessity of either employing an auditor or awaiting the completion of the Insurance Department audit to deter1mine the
technical matters of the financial condition of defendant.
Defendant states at pages 3 and 16, of its Brief, that
generally the fraudulent statements related to the financial
condition of defendant, and at page 6 it admits that it took
all summer for the Insurance Department to audit defendant,
yet it charges laches against plaintiffs for not discovering the
financial condition immediately. Rather inconsistent.
Whether laches exists, is determined by the circumstances of each individual case.
''The question of laches does not depend, as
does the Statute of Limitations, upon the fact that a
certain definite time has elapsed since the cause of
action accrued, but whether, under the circmnstances
of the particular case, plaintiff is chargeable with want
of due diligence in failing to institute or prosecute a
proceedings." Townsend v. Landerserker, 160 U. S.
( 171) 262 ( 16 S. Ct. 258,41 L. Ed. 383), quoted in
Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Company v. Simpson.
{Pa.) 143 A. 202. See Moresco v. Fappiano, 60 P.
2d 430, 7 Cal. 2d 242.
See Frailey v. McGarry, (Utah), 211 P. 2d 840.
The court's attention is called to the following recent,
excellent cases which hold that there can be no rigid rule as
to reasonableness of time within which notice of recission is
given, but that each case rests on its own special circumstances.
King v. Los Angeles County Fair Asso. 161 P. 2d 468; Raht
v. Sevier Mining & Milling Co., 18 Utah 290, 54 P. 889;
Reiniger v. Hassell ( 1932) 13 P. 2d 737; Hugill v. Keene
(1928), 268 P. 624; Ulrich v. San Jacinto Estates, 1952.
241 P. 2d 262; Lubarsky v. Richardson, 1933, 21 P. 2d 557;
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Bryan v. Bawniller, 1928, 272 P. 1106; Schlake v. McConnelL 1927, 257 P. 175; Miller v. Isenberg, 1949, 203 P. 2d
11; Long v. Los Altos Country Club Properties, 1932, 9 P.
2d 600; Sogg v. Harvey, et aL Cal. 1955, 285 P. 2d 104;
Williams v. MarshalL 235 P. 2d 372, where it states:
''There is no artificial rule as to lapse of time
which will justify application of doctrine of laches, but
each case must be determined upon basis of its facts,
and, in absence of palpable abuse of discretion, finding
of trial court will not be disturbed.''
Also, Gedstad v. Ellidunen, et al. Cal. 1954, 269 P. 2d 661;
Chung v. Johnston, Cal. 1954, 274 P. 2d 922: Lobdell, et al.
vs. Miller, Cal. 1953, 250 P. 2d 357. (This is an exceptionally fine case on this and other points involved in the case at
bar.) A reasonable time for recission after discovery of fraud
is allowed before laches exists.
See 55

Am. Jur. 1007; Mawhinney v. Jensen (Utah) supra.

Laches is not allowed unless recision is delayed an unreasonable time and injury results. The California case of
Lobdell v. Miller, supra, held that fifteen months delay did
not constitute laches and was considered a reasonable time
when utilized in investigation as to the falsity of the representations. The case of Williams v. Marshall, supra, holds that
time taken in investigation of fraud, 15-1/2 months in this
case, is not laches and did not justify application of the doctrine of laches. In the following cases there was held to be no
laches: One year, Richards v. Farmers & Merchants Bank, 94
P. 393, 7 Cal. App. 387: three years, Cook v. Darnell. 280
P. 383, 100 Cal. App. 482; from September 1882 to January
1884 Sears v. Hicklin, 21 P. 1022. 13 Colo. 143; from May
1914 to October 1917, Bedal v. Johnson, 218 P. 641, 37
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Idaho 359; short of limitation period, Billings v. Billings, 287
P. 46, 156 Wash. 505; three years. Gould v. James (Wyo.)
299 P. 275; October 20, 1926 to February 25, 1931. Anderson v. Puget Sound Savings & Loan Asso. 18 P. 5, 171
Wash. 378; seven months while investigating, Lynds v.
Los Angeles-Denair Farms Co., 20 P. 2d 792, 131 Cal. App.
58; two years, Dunn v. Security-First National Bank. 21 P.
2c 64 7, 131 Cal. App. 54 1; from September 23, 1925 to
June 26, 1926, long v. Los Altos Country Club Properties,
9 P. 2d. 600, 122 Cal. App. 116: even in the case where
plaintiff collected rents for 18 months after discovery of fraud.
he was held not guilty of laches, Ellis v. Jones, 8 P. 2d 933.
121 Cal. App. 325: five months. Spadoni v. Maggenti. 1932.
8 P. 2d 874: 11 months. Fisher v. Brotherton, 1927, 255 P.
854; ten months. Stewart v. Crowley, 1931, 3 P. 2d 562.
Some cases have held plaintiff not to be guilty of laches
where delayed. on advice of attorney or while attorney was
investigating. Karr v. Sacramento Clay Products Company,
170 P. 446. 35 Cal. App. 439; Wagaman v. Reid Inc. 42
P. 2d 678. 5 Cal. App. 2d 168.
\Ve have shown that there was no unreasonable delay
after Knapp first discovered fraud or should, with reasonable
diligence, have discovered it. Therefore, since there was no
unreasonable delay in serving the notice of recission. but, on
the contrary, great diligence was shown, under the circumstancs. there would be no laches on this ground.
In support of its claim that plaintiffs' action is barred by
laches, defendant states that when Knapp, in August 1955,
turned down the deal to purchase back his former real estate.
he said he would "wait and see what happens." \Ve submit
~that the preponderance of the evidence is that this statement
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was never made by Knapp. The only evidence that it was is
hearsay, wherein Anderson, general counsel of defendant and
original attorney in this case, until he became a witness, stated
that Heaton told him Knapp had made that statement. It
should be remembered that Knapp was not present when this
alleged statement was made. Knapp and Heaton denied it,
because on direct and particularly on cross-examination they
both related the entire conversation between them at the time
of the alleged statement and such a statement was not a part
of the conversation as they both related it. Therefore, they
must both be deemed to have denied its utterance.
But, let us assume, for purpose of argument, that it had
been made. Of what significance was it? Here, Knapp was
tin possession of no facts indicating he had been defrauded. He
didn't become aware of such until about 30 days thereafter.
He most certainly didn't know of his right to rescind but didn't
even suspect it. Therefore there was no intentional relinquishment of a ''known right,'' no one had even mentioned the
possibility of Knapp's having been defrauded. If Knapp had
actually made such a statement, it would be consistent with our
view that he was simply saying that he didn't like what was
being dished up for him and "would wait and see what happens." Or, in other words, would see if they would make him
a better offer of sale or wait and see if they couldn't take some
other corrective means to sell this to someone else to convert it
to an acceptable asset. No one denies that Knapp knew that
defendant was having difficulty with the two big properties
and wanted to get rid of them, but not even Anderson suggests
that the question of fraud was ever mentioned to Heaton or
that he went to Knapp to settle a liability of defendant for
fraud. It was initiated by Heaton so he wouldn't be criticized
_by Knapp for getting out and leaving Knapp in.
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If Knapp had made such a statement, it was a casual one
and the case of Atkinson v. Bland, {W. Va.) 40 S. E. 587,
58 L. R. A. 788, stated that casual statements in social and
business ,matters are not sufficient to operate an estoppel in
pais. We submit that it is equally true that they are not sufficient to constitute laches.
Support is given to our theory that if Knapp did make
such a statement, it is explainable along other lines not consistent with an intent to waive his right to rescind. In the following language of Judge Wolfe in his concurring opinion in
the case of Payson Building & Loan Society v. Taylor, 48 P.
2d 894:
"I cannot say under all the circumstances of this
case that the Taylors were guilty of such delay as to
infer abandonment or waiver of their right to have the
note and mortgage declared null or that any of their
acts were such as not to be explainable along other
lines not consistent with an intent to waive such right."
Waiver of right to rescind must be established by the
clearest evidence.

"* *

an act subsequent to the commission of a
fraud relied upon as constituting waiver of the right
to rescind on account of such fraud must be established
by the clear evidence if account is to be taken thereof.''
24 Am. Jur. 124.
Suspicion of one false statement, of many claimed representations, would not necessarily preclude recovery on other
claimed false representations.
"The mere fact that plaintiffs may have become
suspicious that one or more of the many claimed representations were false would not necessarily preclude
a recovery upon the other claimed false representaSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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tions." Lobdell v. Miller, (Cal.) 250 P. 2d 357.
See also Shearer v. Cooper 21 Cal. 2d 695, 134 P. 2d 764,
and Blackman v. Howse, 82 Cal. App. 2d. 275, 280, 185 P.
2d 1019. 174 A. L. R. 1004.
Now let us tum to the cases cited in defendant's Brief
on this subject of laches. We have carefully read most of
these cases and discover certain interesting facts and conclusions. First: Almost all are California cases and rest on Section
1691 of the Civil Code of California covering recission and
the requirement of prompt recission. The California cases of
Ferguson v. Edgar, 1918, 171 P. 1061; Cohn v. Harada,
1917, 168 P. 1151; Peoples Calif. Safe Deposit & Trust Co.,
126 P. 516; and Campbell v. Title Guarantee & Trust Co.,
9 P. 2d 264, emphasize that under the specific provisions of
the above section, the right of rescission must be promptly
exercised. The case of City & County of San Francisco v.
Trans-bay Construction Co .. 134 P. 2d 468, 320 U. S. 749,
held that this section is rigidly applied. Utah has no such statute. It is apparent that under the rigid interpretation of this
statute the requirement for prompt rescission is greater than
under the common law. unaided by statute. Second: Practically every one of defendant's cited cases involved much longer
delays than in our case and many also involved acceptance
of benefits or positive ratification after discovery of fraud.
Knapp received no benefits of any kind. Practically every one
of the cases holding that there was laches says there was no
explanation or excuse for the delay. Knapp has fully and satisfactorily explained the reason for his short delay. Let us refer
specifically to the cases cited by defendant. The Utah case of
Taylor, cited at page 13 of defendant's Brief involved a three
year delay after discovery of fraud; in the Utah case of McKeller. page 13, the plaintiff had built other buildings on the
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property after discovery of fraud and the case is not in point,
in any event. In the Utah case of Levine, page 14, plaintiff
received contract pa)ments for eleven months after fraud discovery and delayed 2-1/2 years. In the Gedstad case, page
14, 3-112 years passed after fraud discovery and 1-1/2 years
after plaintiff had written a letter saying he had discovered
,fraud. In this case there was no showing of the reason for the
delay. In the Bancroft case, page 14, there was a 2-1/2 year
delay and plaintiff dealt with the property as his own after
fraud discovery. In the Cct,mpbell case. page 14, there was
over nine months of unexplained delay and plaintiff was already in default on his contract. The King case, page 15, involved a two year and one month delay after transfer of assets
and one year and two months after dissolution of corporation,
with no explanation for delay. In the Estrada case, page 15.
twenty months elapsed after discovery of fraud and fifteen
months after discovery of right to rescind. In the Harrington
case, page 16, plaintiff was in the house four years before objecting to the contract. Claimed he didn't discover fraud for
two years. but paid interest on mortgage sixteen months after
fraud discovery. The Lady Washington case, page 16, involved over three years delay. The Ruhl case, page 16. involved a very long delay and turned on affirmance after
discovering fraud. Finally in our own Utah case of Raht. page
24. plaintiff slept on rights over three years; knew of sale of
stock and assented thereto. The Skola case. page 24. was based
on the California Code, Section 1691 and involved over three
months delay and plaintiff made decision to sell his stock.

It would therefore seem that any statement by any of
these cases that thirty days is long enough to rescind is pure
dicta.

(b) Delay alone, without detriment or change
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in position, caused by the delay, is not
laches or a defense to an action in rescission.

As the trial court correctly observed at the triaL (Tr.
141, 142) delay alone, without detriment or change in posi-

tion, caused by the delay, is not laches or a defense to an action
in rescission. We shall hereafter cite authorities to support this
contention. In this case there could have been no detriment to
or change in the position of defendant, resulting from plaintiffs
alleged delay in making election and serving notice. Defendant
argues that it was damaged, because the delay rendered it
impossible to return plaintiffs to status quo, and the reorganization of defendant was permitted to proceed to the detriment
of the financial interests who took over the company.
As previously pointed out in this Brief. defendant by
its own voluntary action and before even it suggests Knapp
had anything to make him suspicious of fraud, placed it beyond its power to put Knapp back in status quo or any semblance of his original position when, on December 30, 1954.
simultaneously with Knapp's assignments of his contracts to
defendant, it cancelled the Knapp contracts and wrote entirely
new ones of different terms, assets, security and parties, "in
lieu of" Knapp's, and when in April 1955, it authorized Volma
Heaton to strip the place of all livestock, sell same and keep
the $5,000.00 as his equity. When Knapp assigned the contracts there was a balance of over $6500.00 owing on the
livestock contract alone, besides livestock, machinery and
equipment included in the so-called real property contract.
Clearly any delay of Knapp could not have contributed to the
changed position of defendant or resulted in detriment to it
by reason of its inability to restore to status quo.
Knapp owed no duty to the financiers who were taking
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over the company on reorganization, but if he had had such
duty, they were put on notice that he might ask for his property back and acted with their eyes open, because Knapp
testified, without contradiction, that he so told Tucker, the
representative of these new people, when he first suspected
fraud in SeptEmber or October 1955, (Tr. 153 to 156), so
there could have been no possible prejudice or change in position resulting from Knapp's delay and therefore no laches
which will bar his recovery.
The case of Fabian v. Alphonzo Bell Corporation, cited
by defendant as authority that prejudice need not be shown,
was based on a special statute, Section 1691 , California Civil
Code. We submit that the great weight of authority sustains
the law as announced by the court, that mere delay without
prejudice or change in position is not laches and will not bar
rescission. See Cook v. Darnell (Cal.) 280 P. 383:
''There was neither pleading nor corresponding
proof of any prejudice having been suffered by appellant or the estate of Emma Darnell as a result of such
delay, and such prejudice must be established before
equitable relief will be denied upon the ground of
laches.''
In the case of Mawhinney v. Jensen (Utah) 232 P. 2d.
769, it was held that in a case of breach of contract to be
established by reformation lapse of time in and of itself does
not generally constitute laches, there must also be showing
of injury or prejudice caused by delay. In the case of Frailey
v. McGarry (Utah) 211 P. 2d 840, after stating that it was
not necessary to rescission that a party act instantaneously
upon discovering fraud but only within a reasonable time
thereafter, with reference to all the circumstances of the particular case, the court stated:
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"Particularly, he must, if possible. avoid such a
delay as will make the ensuing rescission injurious to
the other party or to the intervening interests of third
parties. He must use reasonable diligence in ascertaining the facts which may entitle him to rescind. and
must act so soon after the discovery of them as that
the opposite party will not be unnecessarily prejudiced
by the delay."
See 9 Am. Jur. 390, as follows:
"Section 47. When delay does not constitute
laches or ratification. Only reasonable promptness is
required of one seeking to rescind on the ground of
fraud. A mere delay or lapse of time alone, which
works no prejudice or disadvantage to the defendant,
will not bar the plaintiff of. his right to relief on the
grounds of laches or ratification."
In the case of Pennsylvania, Hartford-Empire Company
v. Glenshaw Glass Co .. 47 F. S. 711, the court held that a
delay of 23 years was not laches unless the other party had
been injured by the delay.
In the California case of Richards v. Farmers & Merchants Bank. 94 P. 393. 7 Cal. App. 387, it was held that a
delay of almost a year after plaintiff's discovery of fraud did
not bar rescission since defendants were unharmed by the delay.
The Washington case of Billings v. Billings, 287 P. 46,
156 Wash. 505, held that the grantor in misleading grantee's
mortgagees, not causing them to alter position to their injury.
but guilty only of delay in objecting to .mortgages was not
estopped by laches, short of limitation period, to assert invalidity thereof. It was held in the California case of Carr v. Sacramento Clay Products Company, 170 P. 466, 35 Cal. App.
439, that a servant who delayed bringing action to rescind a
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release of dffillages for SCflle months by reason of advice of
a reputable attorney was not guilty of laches where the master's
position was not changed.
The case of McDevitt v. Butte City Ranch. 46 P. 2d
290, 7 Cal. App. 2d. 252 holds that the defense of laches
should not be entertained in an action for rescission of contract
unless it would be inequitable to deny defense. The Washington case of Anderson Estate v. Puget Sound Savings &
Loan Association, 18 P. 2d 5, 171 Wash. 378, held that a
delay from October 20, 1926 until February 25, 1931 was
not laches where the delay did not prejudice the payee. The
California case of Earl v. Lofquist, 27 P. 2d 416, 135 Cal.
App. 373, held that laches would not be presumed from a
delay in suing for fraud until 17 months after discovery thereof
in the absence of an affirmative showing of prejudice resulting
therefrom.
The Colorado case of Rogers v. Fitzsimmons, 257 P.
2d. 420, holds this:
''In the absence of any change of position of
parties that would make it inequitable for purchaser
to enforce right of rescission on ground of fraud as to
representation concerning dimensions of property. purchaser \-vas not guilty of laches.''
See also Hill v. Associated Almond Growers. 265 P. 873,
90 Cal. App. 291, and the case of \Vicks v. Smith 21 Kans.
412. 30 Am. Rep. 433: Chase v. Chase (R.I.) 37 A. 804.
quoting Pomeroy on Equity Jurisprudence, Volume 5, paragraph 21. and Connor v. Hodgen {Wash). 267 P. 674:
Samuel v. King {Tenn.) 14 S. W. 2d 963: Parks v. Classen
Company (Okla.) 9 P. 2d 452: Hughes v. \\lallace. (Ky.)
118 S. 334.
\Ve have read and refer this court to the following addtSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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tional. recent cases which unequivocally hold that mere delay
without prejudice is not laches and will not bar rescission. A
particularly good case is the recent one of Beckett v. Kaynar
Mfg. Co., decided in 1957. 315 P. 2d 425, which analyzes
and distinguishes two of the principal cases cited by defendants to the effect that no prejudice must be shown, to-wit,
Bancroft v. Woodward, supra, and Gedstad v. Ellechman,
supra. We urge a reading of this case as it destroys the effectiveness ·of the two principal cases cited by defendant. See
also Long v. Los Altos Country Club Properties, supra:
Barnette v. Wells Fargo Nevada National Bank of San
Francisco, 1926, 270 U. S. 438; 70 L. Ed. 669: Hill v. Associated Almond Growers, 1928, 265 P. 873; Stone v.
McCarty, 1923, 220 P. 690: Reid v. Holcomb, 1923, 218
P. 76: Menefee v. Oxman, 1919, 183 P. 379: 'Deasy v. Taylor, 1919, 178 P. 538: Gerstang v. Skinner, 1913, 134 P.
329: Carr v. Sacramento Clay Products Co. 1918, 170 P.
446: Damerel v. North American Bond & Mortg. Co. 1933,
24 P. 2d 237: McDevett v. Butte City Ranch, 1925, 46 P.
2d 290.

(c) Conclusion of Trial Court, as to whether party
had acted promptly to rescind a contract, or is
guilty o/ laches, will not be set aside by appellate
court i/ the conclusion /inds substantial support
in the evidence.

The trial court found ( R. 21 ) that plaintiffs are entitled to rescind the transaction, did not waive their right to
rescind, were not guilty of such delay or laches as to justify
denying their right to rescission and are not estopped by their
conduct or by any delay ·to demand rescission. If there is substantial evidence to support these findings, the Appellate
Court will not disturb such findings or reverse the judgment.
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This is well stated in a recent California case decided in
1955, Sogg v. Harvey, 285 P. 2d. 104, in the following language:
"Whether a party claiming to have been defrauded has rescinded promptly depends on the circumstances o/ the particular case and is a question primarily
for the trial court. French v. French. 191, Cal. 5 79,
589, 217 P. 515; Noll v. Baida, 202 Cal. 98, 105.
259 P. 433; Esau v. Briggs, 89 Cal. App. 2d 427.
438, 201 P. 2d 25. It is a question o/ /act. Miller v.
Eisenberg, 90 Cal. App 2d 479, 482, 203 P. 2d 11.
The conclusion o/ the trial court will not be set aside by
a reviewing court i/ it /inds reasonable support in the
evidence. McCray v. Title Ins. & Trust Co .. 12 Cal.
App. 2d 537. 538. 55 P. 2d 1234."

To the same effect are the following cases: Utah case of
Cole v. Parker, 1956, 300 P. 2d 623; Gedstad v. Ellichman.
Cal.. 1954, supra; Beckett v. Kaynar Mfg. Co., supra; King v.
Los Angeles County Fair Association, et al. supra. A particularly good case is that of Cole v. Calaway, Cal. 1956, 295 P.
2d 84, stating it thusly:
''As was said in Fabian v. .A.Iphonzo E. Bell
Corporation, 55 Cal. App. 2d 413, 415, 130 P. 2d
779 781:
'The question of laches is one for the determination of the trial court and its conclusion thereon will
not be set aside by an appellate court. if such conclusion finds substantial support in the evidence.

***

"It is not possible to designate a definite period of
time within which a party must give notice of recission
of a contract because of misrepresentation, fraud etc ..
but the facts peculiar to each case are determinative
thereof.' See also Hunt v. L. M. Field. Inc .. 202 Cal.
701. 705. 262 P. 730."
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See also Chung v. Johnson, Cal. 1954, supra, Lobdell,
et al, v. Miller, et al, Cal. 1953, supra. The case of Hunt v.
Field, Cal 1928, 262 P. 730, is a particularly good case holding:
"An examination of the record leads us to condude that there is ample evidence to sustain the findings complained of. It is true that the evidence adduced
by the appellant conflicts in many material respects
with that offered by the respondent. The rule is well
settled, however, that findings based upon substantially conflicting evidence may not be disturbed by an appellate court. Taber v. Besks, 182 Cal. 214, 217, 187
P. 746; Blanc v. Connor, 167 Cal. 719, 722, 151 P.
217; Estate of Moore, 162 Cal. 324, 326, 122 P.
824; Still v. San Francisco & N.W.R. Co., 154 Cal.
559, 564, 9 P.8 672, 20 L.R.A. (N.S.) 322, 129
Am. St. Rep. 177."
See also Williams v. Marshall, Cay. 1951, supra, as follows:
"The courts have frequently declared that there
is no artificial rule as to the lapse of time which will
justify the application of the doctrine of laches. Each
case must be determined upon the basis of its facts, and
in the absence of a palpable abuse of discretion the
trial court's finding upon the issue will not be disturbed upon appeal. Hunt v. L. M. Field, Inc., 202
Cal. 701, 705, 262 P. 730; McDevitt v. Butte City
Ranch, 7 Cal. App. 2d 252, 254, 46 P. 2d 290."
These are salutory principles of law. After all, the trial
court has before it the witnesses and is able to observe their
demeanor, judge their credibility and more accurately evaluate
their testimony.
Was there substantial evidence in this case? Reference
to and an analysis of the evidence on this matter will be
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found under subdivisions (a) and (b) of this Point 1, to which
we respectfully <lirect the court's attention. We earnestly
contend that not only is there substantial evidence to support
such finding, but that a great preponderance of such evidence
does so, and therefore, this court should not disturb such find~
ing.
POINT II
THERE IS LEGAL AND COMPETENT EVIDENCE
TO SUPPORT THE MONEY JUDGMENT
AWARDED PLAINTIFFS IN THIS ACfiON.
ARGUMENT
Defendant contends that there is no evidence to support
the money judgment awarded plaintiffs. Plaintiffs maintain
that the evidence does support such judgment.
\Ve feel that defendant is confusing this whole issue and
that the cases its cites are distinguishable from our case on their
facts and are no authority against the action of the trial court
in awarding plaintiffs a money judgment in the amount stated.
Every case cited by defendant, involved the trade of
real property which was not sold under contract. In our case,
as the trial court correctly observed, the things sold to defendant were the two contracts o/ sale, which contained an unequivocal promise to pay, which had a definite balance owing
at the time of assignment. They were much like any other
obligation to pay an amount certain, and specific perfotmance
could be compelled. Payments were right up to date. (Tr. 37).
The real and personal property described in the contracts was
incidental and collateral to the contracts, held merely as
security. So long as the buyers performed under their contracts.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

39
the sellers had no more rights to the possession or ownership
of said securities than a stranger. In other words, it was not
the properties which plaintiffs sold to defendant, but the contracts of sale, secured by such properties.
The value of the assigned contracts might depend but
little on the value of the underlying security. Proof of the value
of the security would not, as contended by defendant, determine the value of the contracts and is incompetent and irrelevant.
Surely defendant would not contend that if the underlying security, which could not be returned, were shown to
have been worth $75,000.00, although the balance owing
on the contracts of sale, at the date of the transaction, were
only $34,383,03, that plaintiffs would be entitled to recover the Jull $75,000.00. Of course not. It would then
correctly say that the limit of plaintiffs' recovery is the balance
owing on the thing sold, ie., the contracts of sale. This demonstrates how wrong defendant's reasoning is. Doesn't it illustrate the saying, "heads I win, tails you lose"?
It is our contention that the balance owing on the contracts is the measure of the money judgment to which plaintiffs are entitled and that it is as though cash had been paid to
defendant. since the contracts of the third persons to pay a
definite amount of cash, were ~assigned. As the court remarked
in the course of the trial. plaintiffs as sellers under the contracts
were entitled to be paid in \Illoney the balance then due. (Tr.
977). In case suit is brought on a promissory note or other
promise to pay, the court doesn't inquire of the worth of the
note, but gives a judgment for the full amount thereof. But if
further proof of value were needed, it is supplied in the written
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agreement of January 5, 1955, (Ex. P. 9 D. 20) wherein the
parties solemnly declared in writing, that the value of the
''contracts of sale,'' not, mind you, the properties described
therein, was $34,383.03, the exact balance owing on such
contracts.
We submit that that definitely fixes such values, is the
best evidence thereof. that defendant is estopped to question
same and cannot vary the terms of that written instrument by
parole or contradictory testimony. It is conclusive evidence of
such value and is binding on both parties on the question of
value. To admit evidence of the value of properties which
secured these contracts would open up a vast field of speculation and irrelevant testimony and would be error. We might
point out that defendant made no offer of evidence as to the
value of livestock. machinery and other personal property
which formed a great portion of such security. (Tr. 808).
Now, referring to the cases cited by defendant. we have
studied each one carefully. They simply announce the correct principle that if status quo cannot be achieved by return
of the property, the plaintiffs should be awarded a money
judgment for the value of that which cannot be returned. We
have no quarrel with that proposition. But not one of the cases
involved a contract balance with a sum certain owing thereon.
Each involved a trade of title to real property. It is true, that
in some of them. the parties had given a receipt, stating a
value of the traded property or had placed some value on it in
their contracts. but when it was discovered that instead of
being cash it was merely title to real estate which had been
traded, the court said that in the case of rescission, where the
property could not be returned, the real value should be ascertained of the real estate traded. But, how different are the
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situations and facts between those cases and ours. There the
titles to real properties were involved and the thing was traded.

Often puffing of values occurs in such cases, merely to effectuate the trade. One fellow places a value on his property and
the other one boosts the value of his to correspond, with little
attention to real values. In such cases, perhaps evidence of
real .value is justified in order to place the parties in status quo.
In our case, there was no bartering and trading. The stock
which plaintiffs purchased had a definite established selling
price of $20.00 a share, and the contracts had a definite
amount owing thereon. The parties solemnly agreed such balance was the actuaL reasonable value. Not one of defendant's
cited cases says that the "agreed value" in such a case as ours
is not the "real value" which should be awarded to the plaintiffs.
Now referring directly to defendant's cited cases on this
point. The Marks case cited at page 25 of their Brief holds
that the court may make a judgment in the alternative, as the
court did in this case. It then holds that if the real estate
which was traded cannot be returned judgment should be
awarded for ''the value'' thereof at the time of consummation
of the agreement of sale. It did not say that the "agreed value"
might not be the "real value." This is distinguished from our
case in th0.t it involved a trade of real estate by both parties.
The Blaknik case, page 26, was not a fraud case but failure of
consideration. It differs from our case in that it involved a
trade of real estate while in our case it was a contract with a
definite balance owing. In that case credit was simply given
for the real estate traded while in our case it was a definite
sum owing and solemn agreement as to value. The Lasher
case, page 27, involved two vacant lots and was not a fraud
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case but was decided under the special California Code providing for rescission. The Swan case, on page 28, presented a
situation where value had to be determined. A drunk man
conveyed real property worth $21,900.00 in exchange for
$200.00 cash and satisfaction of a $10,600.00 indebtedness.
It is pointed out that an equity court will give relief in such
cases. Finally, the Merigold case, page 28. was an agreement
to purchase real estate. Receipt was acknowledged of
$3,735.00. It was discovered that such payment was not in
cash but in land, quite different from our case. It was not a
fraud case but for a breach. We submit that each and every
one of these cases are entirely distinguishable both in fact and
in law from our case. This must have been the view also of the
California Court because in the case of Lobdell, et al. v.
Miller, et al. 250 P. 2d 357, decided in 1953, which is considerably later than any of the cases cited by defendant in its
Brief, the court reviews such earlier cases and then enunciates
the following doctrine:
''As to the item o/ $300, being the difference in
agreed value o/ the real property deeded to defendants
as part o/ the purchase price and the actual value thereof as contended by defendants. the court. under its
equitable powers. had the right to /ix the agreed value
as the amount /or which defendants should account.
Swan v. Talbot. 152 Cal. 142. 94 P. 238. 17 L.R.A ..
N.S., 1066; Thompson vs. Stoakes, 46 Cal. App. 2d
285, 293, 115 P. 2d 830; Lasher v. Faw, 209 Cal.
726. 735, 289. P. 821."
We most earnestly direct the court's attention to this
case and urge that it be read, as it is a most scholarly discussion
of many of the points found in our case and which are the
subject of appeal. Here the court stated that the court, under
its equitable powers, had the right to fix the agreed value as
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the proper measure of damage. Our case is much stronger on
'its facts than the Lobdell case because the subject of our sale
was contracts of sale, with a definite balance owing, in money,
and the parties solemnly agreed in writing what the real and
reasonable value was, it being the balance owing. In the Lobdell case it involved merely real property. As shedding some
light on this matter and supporting plaintiffs' views, we refer
the court to a very recent Utah case, Cole v. Parker, supra,
decided in 1956, wherein it was said:
"In the absence of fraud or imposition, the parties
-are bound by the price or measure of value they have
agreed on, and such price must be paid notwithstanding
it may be excessive. The courts cannot supervise decisions made in the business world and grant relief when
the bargain proves improvident.
"Thus in the absence of a finding or fraud, the
seller is entitled to be credited, in the computation of
damage sustained because of the breach of the contract,
the difference between the contract price and the price
for which he can sell the forfeited property. The /act
that, according to plaintiffs' evidence, this amount exceeds the amount paid on the contract forecloses further inquiry as to whether or not the forfeiture provision
of the contract properly assessed the actual damages
suffered by the defendants."

1

We think the Utah case of McKeller Real Estate & Investment Co., et al. v. Paxton, et al. 218 P. 128, also sustains
plaintiffs' position in the follOMTing language:
''The value of the premises with the building actually accepted by the defendants can only be determined by the court upon testimony. The difference,
if any, between the value as fixed by the contract and
the actual value as completed by plaintiffs and ac-
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cepted by defendants necessarily measures the damages
sustained by defendants.''
CONCLUSION
We respectfully submit that judgment should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
VERNON ROMNEY, &
GEORGE L. NELSON
of Romney & Nelson,
VERNON B. ROMNEY.
Attorneys for Respondents.
Received three copies of the foregoing Brief this _________________ _
day of_ ___________________________________ , 1958.

Counsel for Defendant and Appellant
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